The full paper is available on the EFF Website
There are two ways to add a paper ballot to an evoting sytem. The first is to take an optical scan system, and add a computer interface for users to vote. The second is to take Direct Recording Electronic system and add a printer. Here's an overview of solutions on or nearing the market.
Electronic Ballot Markers
Electronic ballot markers can be used to fill out optical scan ballots. These systems look like traditional DREs, but they record votes on paper ballots instead of internal memory. This kind of machine can match all of a DRE’s accessibility features (audio interface, sip/puff input, multiple languages, etc.), and every vote can be verified before submission:
a. Avante’s14 Optical Vote-Trakker15 is a federally qualified, accessible, electronic ballot-marking system. It was the first system qualified to the FEC’s 2002 voting standards, a designation that means, in part, that it produces a 0% error rate even after 1.5 million votes. Certification is pending in several states.
b. ES&S, 16 the world’s largest election equipment manufacturer, is also in the process of attaining federal qualification for an electronic ballot marking system. It will be available later this year.17
DREs with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trails
DREs equipped with a VVPAT can also provide auditable, accessible voting:
a. Avante’s Vote-Trakker18 is an accessible, VVPAT-equipped DRE that has completed federal testing. It is certified for use in several states and has certifications pending in others.19 This system has been used successfully in five separate elections and the American Council of the Blind lists the Vote-Trakker as an accessible voting system.20 In addition, Jim Dickson of AAPD has called Avante’s VVPAT an “elegant way” to provide a paper audit trail if one is mandated.
b. AccuPol produces a federally qualified, accessible, VVPAT-equipped DRE system. The company is actively pursuing state contracts and expects to have equipment in the field for the November 2004 election. The American Council for the Blind lists AccuPoll as an accessible voting system manufacturer.
c. Sequoia Voting Systems,25 the country’s third-largest election equipment manufacturer, will have a VVPAT-equipped AVC Edge26 on the market by the summer of 2004. The unit will be deployed in every Nevada election jurisdiction in time for the 2004 presidential election.
d. TruVote is in the process of qualifying a VVPAT-equipped DRE. The system also allows voters to verify that their vote was part of the final vote tally via a post-election web interface. The TruVote system should be qualified and available for purchase in the summer of 2004.
Texas Secretary of State Geoffrey Connor issued a press release this week denying that there were problems with electronic voting -- while the State of Ohio dumped Diebold for security holes.
Connor describes electronic voting as a "special interest" issue, even as Republican adminstrations in Ohio and Nevada have dumped insecure evoting systems and required paper trails.
Ohio and Nevada reached their conclusions after security reviews by expert security consultants. Connor representatives say there are no plans to commission a study here.
Connor claims that evaluation process here is the best in the country. But we've seen the videos (they're available under the Open Records Act). There's little discussion of security in the evaluation, and no methodical testing against security criteria. The evaluation itself is conducted behind closed doors.
Connor reassures Texans that there have been no proven incidents yet of voter fraud. The security of a Diebold system is equivalent to leaving your door open, and your front door key on the mat. Connor is telling us "I've left my front door unlocked for a month, and nobody has broken in yet, it must be safe."
Without a voter-verifiable paper trail, there is no good way to audit an election in the case of voting system tampering. So if there has been fraud, we would have no way of knowing.
Unlike his peers in other states taking leadership roles, our Secretary of State has his head in the sand.
Contact Geoffrey Connor and let him know that Texans want him to act:
• stop deploying new electronic voting systems until the concerns raised by reports in Ohio and other states have been addressed
• review and approve voting systems providing a voter-verified paper ballot, so Texans can confident that their votes count.
• Commission an independent study in the State of Texas to examine the security and auditability of the electronic voting system and voting process
• Review for State certification electronic voting systems that provide a voter-verifiable paper ballot, which provide assurance of a valid recount in case of security issues
Texas Safe Voting is working to bring about safe and reliable evoting, including a voter-verifiable paper trail.
Organizational support for Texas Safe Voting is provided by the ACLU of Texas. Donations to support Texas Safe Voting can be made to: ACLU Cyberliberties Project, 1210 Rosewood St., Austin TX 78702.
Texas Safe Voting reviewed the videotapes of the January 2004 closed meetings used to review voting systems for certification (the videos were acquired by open records requests).
What we saw may shock you. Here's a two minute clip, in Windows and Quicktime format. The clips show how the state of Texas examines voting machines for certification.
A group of examiners reviews voting systems, and makes certification recommendations to the Secretary of State. You might think that these examiners would conduct a comprehensive testing process, assessing the voting machines against a set of detailed critieria and discussing the underlying code.
But there was nothing on the videotapes that resembled a testing process. The examiners didn't start with a set of criteria to test against. They didn't even start with a comparison the new machines to the older versions. Instead, the Diebold representatives gave a demo. Reviewers voted on the machines and looked at the final output. A few of the committee members watched closely, while others chatted together.
The examiners found out, apparently by accident, that using Diebold’s provisional voting system, it was possible for two voters to vote using the same ID number -- or for one voter to vote multiple times. In practice, the Diebold representative explained, they give out paper stickers to make sure that each person votes only once.
For provisional voters (those who have recently moved into the precinct or cannot prove their residence) the Diebold system didn't meet the most basic criteria of a voting system -- one person one vote. Diebold didn't disclose this flaw before the examination. And -- this system had already been certified in the state of Texas. This system was used in the last election in El Paso. In its discussion about the legal legitimacy of two votes recorded under the same ID number, examiners realized that there would be no way to tell good votes from fraudulent ones, and only strict adherence to the “sticker” procedure would prevent a problem.
But--at a minimum--an electronic voting machine should be able to issue a unique ID number for each voter. There is something wrong with a certification system that lets this happen. We need to tell the Secretary of State that the process of certifying voting systems should be open to the public.
To download a model letter for the Secretary of State, click here.
A copy of the Texas Safe Voting press release is here.
Democratic and Republican party activists are calling on both parties to support a platform resolution requiring a voter-verifiable paper trail. If you are concerned about the issue, bring the resolution to your precinct meeting on election day.